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ARTICLE 14 OF CHINA’S NEW LABOR CONTRACT LAW:  
USING OPEN-TERM CONTRACTS TO APPROPRIATELY 
BALANCE WORKER PROTECTION AND EMPLOYER 
FLEXIBILITY 
Jovita T. Wang† 
Abstract: China’s economy rapidly developed as it shifted from a planned 
economy to a market economy.  Cheap labor encouraged foreign companies to conduct 
business in China, but that business came at the expense of labor protection.  Workers 
who had previously enjoyed lifetime employment suddenly faced rampant layoffs, labor 
abuse, and unemployment.  Despite China’s implementation of the Labor Law in 1994, 
labor abuse continued, especially by employers refusing to follow written contract 
requests to define the employment relationship.  Many workers were left unprotected. 
In response to these problems, China passed the Labor Contract Law in 2007 to 
clarify requirements of employment contracts and to inform both employers and workers 
of their rights and obligations.  The law was intended to promote better employment 
relationships.  Article 14 of the Labor Contract Law worked to accomplish this end by 
allowing the use of open-term employment contracts.  Foreign companies and investors, 
however, have voiced concern that the Labor Contract Law’s encouragement of open-
term contracts will negatively affect their business in China and make it nearly 
impossible to dismiss workers.  Some of these fears have been realized in South Korea 
under similar employment laws. 
While open-term contracts will inevitably increase some business costs, the benefits 
of the new Chinese Labor Contract Law outweigh such costs.  Because workers will be 
more invested in business operations, open-term employment contracts will improve 
employment relationships and make businesses more profitable.  Additionally, in contrast 
to South Korea’s employment laws, Article 14 of the Labor Contract Law includes 
sufficient regulations and flexible requirements to prevent open-term employment 
contracts from becoming a ticket to lifetime employment.  Open-term employment 
contracts can advance China’s economic development. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
China is experiencing rapid growth while developing into a market 
economy.  Behind the country’s economic success, however, lies widespread 
labor abuse.1  Workers’ main recourse in employment disputes is self-help.2  
Recruiters often falsely lure migrant workers into abysmal working 
conditions, where wages are withheld and security guards prevent escape.3  
                                           
†
  Juris Doctor expected 2010, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like to 
thank Professor Mary Hotchkiss and the editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their 
guidance throughout the writing process. 
1
  Sean Cooney, Making Chinese Labor Law Work: The Prospects for Regulatory Innovation in the 
People’s Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1050, 1050 (2007). 
2
  Id. 
3
  ANITA CHAN, CHINA’S WORKERS UNDER ASSAULT: THE EXPLOITATION OF LABOR IN A 
GLOBALIZING ECONOMY 7-8 (Mark Selden ed., 2001). 
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These types of abuses have resulted in domestic and some international 
pressure on China to reform its labor laws.4  The Chinese government has 
recognized that it must reconcile economic growth with increased 
“governability, stability, and democracy.”5 
In 1994, the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s 
Congress (“NPC”) of the People’s Republic of China adopted the Labor Law 
of the People’s Republic of China (“Labor Law”).  China’s passage of the 
Labor Law was a stride towards creating a harmonious work structure in 
China’s changing economy.6  The Labor Law provided comprehensive rules 
addressing workers’ rights, labor contracts, discrimination, and social 
insurance.7  Workers, however, still found worker protections inadequate.8  
The protections of the Labor Law only applied to workers who had a written 
contract or strong proof of an employment relationship.9  Because many 
employers did not provide such contracts despite being required to do so by 
the Labor Law, many workers were left unprotected.10  Often, employers 
overworked and underpaid their workforce.11  Employers regularly refused 
to renew contracts.12  Additionally, the government enforced labor laws 
inconsistently, especially because provinces and local cities created their 
own regulations.13 
On January 1, 2008, China’s new Labor Contract Law (“LCL”) went 
into effect.14  The government made improvements to the 1994 Labor Law 
by changing contractual employment protections and expanding the scope of 
application.15  The LCL is the first national law in China governing 
                                           
4
  See Cooney, supra note 1, at 1050. 
5
  SUJIAN GUO & BAOGANG GUO, Introduction to CHALLENGES FACING CHINESE POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 11 (Sujian Guo & Baogang Guo eds., 2007). 
6
  Labor Law [Labor Law 1994] art. 1 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
7
  Id. 
8
  See Aaron Halegua, Getting Paid: Processing the Labor Disputes of China’s Migrant Workers, 26 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 254, 274 (2008). 
9
  Id. 
10
  Haina Lu, New Developments in China’s Labor Dispute Resolution System: Better Protection for 
Workers’ Rights?, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 247, 256 (2008). 
11
  Lyle Morris, An Uncertain Victory for China’s Workers, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE, June 24, 2008, 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=10983Yale Global (last visited Nov. 14, 2008). 
12
  Draft Law on Labor Contracts Made Public—Views Sought, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 21, 
2006, http://www.china.org.cn/archive/2006-03/21/content_1162551.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). 
13
  Jeffrey A. Blount & Lixin Chen, Working With China’s New Labor Contract Law, in DOING 
BUSINESS IN CHINA 129, 131 (Practising Law Institute ed., 2008). 
14
  Labor Contract Law [Labor Contract Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
15
  It applies to “all aspects of labor contracts between workers and enterprises, all types of economic 
entities, and private non-profit entities.”  Adam Bobrow et al., International Legal Developments in 
Review: 2007, 42 INT’L LAW. 945, 962 (2008).  Xie Liangmin of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
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employment contracts.16  For instance, it addresses the formation 
requirements of an employment contract, whereas the previous labor law did 
not.17  Under the Labor Law, local tribunals had freedom to implement 
regulations that reflected their own interpretation of the Labor Law.  By 
contrast, LCL provides guidance to ensure that local regulations will be 
uniform and consistent with national law.18  Such uniformity should help 
companies with operations in more than one city ensure compliance.19 
The LCL aimed to increase worker protection in response to China’s 
fast-paced and capitalist-style economic growth.20  The law passed after the 
slave labor scandal in the coal mines of Shanxi and Henan provinces.21  The 
government realized that violations of workers’ rights, not to mention the 
resulting strikes, negatively affected social stability and economic 
development.22  The government passed other employment laws in addition 
to LCL, such as the Employment Promotion Law.23  This legislative 
overhaul demonstrated China’s recognition that it must protect workers to 
                                                                                                                              
has stated that, "[t]he new law is not designed to replace the current Labor Law; rather, it attempts to 
further standardize the labor contract in favor of employees.”  Labor Law: 'No Giving in to Pressure,' 
CHINA DAILY, Jun. 12, 2007, http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/213567.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 
2009). 
16
  Employees’ Rights to be Better Protected, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 25, 2006, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/national/2006-12/28/content_1193715.htm. 
17
  Sean Cooney et al., China’s New Labour Contract Law: Responding to the Growing Complexity 
of Labour Relations in the PRC, 30 UNIV. N.S.W. L. J. 786, 787, 792 (2007). 
18
  Joanna Law, Employment Regulations May Prove a Burden for Employers, CHINA L. & PRAC., 
Oct. 2008. 
19
  Id. 
20
  See Morris, supra note 11. 
21
 China's Legislature Adopts Labor Contract Law, XINHUA, Jun. 30, 2007, http://english. 
people.com.cn/200706/29/eng20070629_388809.html# (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).  Migrant workers were 
forced to work long hours without compensation in illegal mining and brick kilns industries.  Id.  See 
Joseph Kahn & David Barboza, China Passes a Sweeping Labor Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 30, 2007.  There 
was public outcry when the government failed to prosecute many of the responsible officials.  Han 
Dongfang, The Shanxi Brickyard Scandal and Child Labour in China, CHINA LAB. BULL., July 25, 2007, 
http://www.china-labour.org.hk/en/node/47600 (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). 
22
  Zana Z. Bugaighis, Comment, What Impact Will the Revised Trade Union Law of China Have on 
Foreign Business?, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007).  See also Mortimer B. Zuckerman, A 
Giant's Growing Pains, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 15, 2006, available at http://www.usnews.com/ 
usnews/opinion/articles/060123/23edit.htm (mentioning the higher concentration of economic growth along 
the coast has resulted in peasant worker strikes in the interior parts of the country).   
23
  “The law is enacted to promote employment, promote positive interaction between economic 
development and increase of employment, and promote the harmony and stability of society.”  
Employment Promotion Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, 
effective Jan. 1, 2008) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 18, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
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prevent future social unrest.24  In many respects, the LCL sought to bring 
business practices in China more in line with international standards.25 
Some foreign companies and investors are concerned that Article 14 
of LCL encourages open-term employment contracts.  An open-term 
employment contract is a contract for which the employer and the employee 
have agreed not to stipulate a definite ending date.26  Two possibilities raise 
particular concern:  first, that the provision will be enforced unfairly against 
foreign employers; and second, that the provision will increase costs by 
reducing the ability of businesses to expand and contract when economically 
necessary.  Generally, employers are concerned with LCL’s long-term 
implications for the workforce. 
This Comment asserts that while these are valid concerns, particularly 
in light of the effect of similar labor laws in South Korea, LCL strikes the 
appropriate and necessary—although imperfect—balance between 
protecting workers’ rights and allowing employers to retain flexibility, which 
in turn ensures the productivity and profitability of their businesses.  The 
LCL does not create employment for life, nor does it force employers to 
retain workers when doing so would be detrimental to business.  Combined 
with clarifying regulations, LCL paves a bright path for China’s future social 
and economic development. 
Part II of this Comment provides background on the employment 
changes enacted by the Chinese government and discusses the legislative 
history behind the 1994 Labor Law and the law’s unresolved issues.  Part III 
discusses how the new LCL seeks to resolve the gaps left by the 1994 Labor 
Law and focuses on Article 14—the provision providing for open-term 
contracts as well as its implementing regulations.  Part IV addresses the 
possible impact of LCL, particularly Article 14, on foreign businesses, many 
of which are concerned that the law is too burdensome.27  It also explains the 
concerns of foreign businesses by analyzing the effects of a similar labor law 
in South Korea.  Part V discusses how LCL alleviates these concerns and 
contrasts the Chinese Law with the Korean law.  Part VI describes the 
potential benefits of flexible open-term contracts to China’s transition from 
an industrial to a value-added economy. 
                                           
24
  See A Worker’s Manifesto for China; Economics Focus, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2007; St. 
Council, Notice of the State Council on Doing a Good Job in Promoting Employment (Feb. 3, 2008), 
available at LAWINFOCHINA (P.R.C.).  
25
  See Morris, supra note 11. 
26
  Labor Contract Law art. 14. 
27
  See Morris, supra note 11. 
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II. THE 1994 LABOR LAW INADEQUATELY ADDRESSED THE NEEDS OF 
CHINA’S WORKERS 
China, as a rapidly developing country, has encountered problems 
with employers abusing the labor force.28  Politicians initially enacted the 
Labor Law of 1994, which provided a foundation of new worker and 
employer rights in response to the labor abuses created by the combination 
of China’s economic change to factories and the loss of guaranteed 
employment.29  The law was made to protect the interests of labor in a way 
that reflected the societal needs of the developing market economy.30  The 
Labor Law additionally aspired to establish a uniform body of rules that 
would equitably govern all employers and workers in China.31  Yet the Labor 
Law of 1994 also left many questions unanswered and was weakly 
enforced.32 
A. The Labor Law of 1994 Was Intended to Protect China’s Workers in 
Response to Its Changing Economy  
The Labor Law of 1994 was passed to protect Chinese workers.  In 
the 1950s, the Chinese Communist Party stringently protected employment 
through its “‘iron rice bowl’ system,” which guaranteed lifetime 
employment.33  Once China transitioned from a planned economy to a 
socialist market economy, however, layoffs, unemployment, and labor abuse 
became rampant.34  In response to these problems, China enacted the Labor 
Law, which passed on July 5, 1994, and came into effect on January 1, 
1995.35  The Labor Law applied to all enterprises and individual economic 
organizations and protected laborers whose employment was governed by an 
employment contract.36  Its stated purpose was to implement the 
Constitutional provisions that protect “the legitimate rights and interests of 
laborers, readjust labor relationships, establish and safeguard a labor system 
suited to the socialist market economy, and promote economic development 
                                           
28
  See Bugaighis, supra note 22, at 410. 
29
  K. Lesli Ligorner, 2008: Year of Broadening Employee Rights and EEO Protections in China, 
CHINA L. & PRAC., Jun. 2008. 
30
  Labor Law 1994 ch. 1. 
31
  See Douglas C. Markel, Editor’s Notes: PRC Labour Law, CHINA L. & PRAC., Jan. 1994. 
32
  See id. 
33
  J. PRYBYLA, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: PROBLEMS & POLICIES 132, 173 (2d ed. 1981).  See also  
Bugaighis, supra note 22, at 409 (mentioning how jobs were provided by local labor bureaus and included 
furnished housing and health coverage).   
34
  Bugaighis, supra note 22, at 410. 
35
  Labor Law 1994. 
36
  Id. art 2. 
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and social progress.”37  The law was intended to provide worker protections 
through the usage of employment contracts. 
B. The Labor Law of 1994 Failed to Strengthen Worker Protection  
Despite the Labor Law’s laudable goals, it did not provide detailed 
specifications for employment contracts and, thus, failed to increase the 
ability of contracts to protect workers.  For instance, the law did not specify 
what constitutes an invalid employment contract and did not provide strong 
regulation of open-term contracts.38  Only Article 20 of the Labor Law 
discussed the terms of employment contracts and did not specify what 
constitutes “fixed term, flexible term or taking the completion of a specific 
amount of work as a term.”39  For example, Article 20 provided that if a 
laborer works for the “same employing unit for ten years or more and the 
parties involved agree to extend the term of the labour contract, a labour 
contract with a flexible term shall be concluded between them if the labourer 
so requested.”40  The law seemed to put the burden on the worker to make 
the request.  Article 20 provided no further information regarding the 
different requirements for each contract.  As a result, the law did not 
generate clear expectations for employers and workers.41 
In addition, employers failed to follow crucial requirements of the 
Labor Law, resulting in continued job insecurity.  In particular, employers 
often failed to comply with the Labor Law’s mandatory requirement to 
create a written contract before establishing a working relationship.42  By not 
providing written contracts, employers avoided supervision by labor bureaus 
and avoided paying taxes and mandated insurance.43  Employers also 
retaliated against workers who requested a written contract in accordance 
with the Labor Law.44  Countrywide, as of 2006, it was estimated that 
seventy percent of rural workers and fifteen percent of urban workers have 
no contract.45  Even workers with contracts often had contracts with terms of 
                                           
37
  Id. art. 1. 
38
  LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA 2005 489 (Liu Fahe ed., 2005). 
39
  Labor Law 1994. 
40
  Id. 
41
  LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA 2005, supra note 38, at 489. 
42
  See Halegua, supra note 8, at 273-74. 
43
  Id. at 276.  
44
  See id.  
45  Brendan Smith et al., Multinationals to China: No New Labor Rights (Business Against Labor 
Rights in China), MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (Nov.-Dec. 2006), http://find.galegroup.com/itx/infomark.do? 
action=interpret&contentSet=IACDocuments&type=retrieve&tabID=T002&prodId=EAIM&docId=A1628
83794&source=gale&version=1.0&userGroupName=wash_eai&finalAuth=true (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). 
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three years or less.46  For instance, it was estimated that sixty percent of all 
contracts were for three years or less.47  Hence, job security had not 
improved. 
With discontent among workers growing a decade after the Labor 
Law’s passage, the Chinese government began focusing on improving 
workers’ rights.48  The government decided to achieve this goal by 
elaborating on and strengthening the requirements of employment contracts 
through legislation. 
III. THE NEW LABOR CONTRACT LAW OF 2007 ADDRESSES WORKER 
PROTECTION AND SOCIAL STABILITY IN CHINA’S ERA OF RAPID 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The LCL builds upon the goals of the Labor Law of 1994 by, first, 
furthering protection of workers’ rights and, second, providing a predictable 
and uniform framework for local tribunals in making employment law 
decisions.49  The first draft of LCL was issued for public comment on March 
20, 2006.50  After making substantial modifications over the course of four 
drafts, the Standing Committee of the NPC adopted the final version on June 
29, 2007, which became effective January 1, 2008.51  The LCL applies to all 
employers doing business in China, regardless of the number of persons 
employed.52  The LCL also seeks to promote “harmonious” relationships 
between employers and workers and to protect “the lawful rights and 
interests” of workers.53 
A. The LCL Clarifies the Conditions of Employment Relationships 
In contrast to the Labor Law, LCL clearly stipulates the requirements 
of an employment relationship through the use of contracts.  It provides 
specific requirements for employment contracts.  For instance, LCL requires 
that all employment contracts be in writing.54  It further provides that 
employers must maintain a written worker handbook stating the basic rules 
                                           
46
  Id. 
47
  Id.   
48
  See Draft Law on Labor Contracts Made Public—Views Sought, supra note 12.   
49
  See Putting China’s Labour Contract Law into Practice, CHINA L. & PRAC., Mar. 2008 (translated 
by Joanna Law). 
50
  Cooney, supra note 1, at 1077. 
51
  Haina Lu, supra note 10, at 248. 
52
  Labor Contract Law art. 2. 
53
  Labor Contract Law art. 1. 
54
  Labor Contract Law art. 10. 
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and regulations of employment.55  The LCL also states that probationary 
periods be limited according to the employment contract, with the maximum 
possible period of six months—a reiteration of the Labor Law of 1994.56  
The LCL, however, elaborates on time periods when the probation period is 
reduced.57  Additionally, it defines the requirements for mandatory non-
competition agreements, making such agreements only applicable to senior 
management or workers with access to important trade secrets and limiting 
their duration to two years.58 
The LCL also provides additional requirements to ensure that 
employers comply with its requirements for employment contracts.  In the 
hopes of improving employer-worker relations, employers are required to 
consult with workers or the labor union when deciding on important rules 
and matters related to the workers, such as working hours, rest days, labor 
safety, and labor discipline.59  Employers may also only terminate workers 
for cause consistent with the regulations stated in the workers’ handbook or 
in accordance with the law.60 
The LCL clearly stipulates penalties for violations of the law and 
provides avenues for workers to protect themselves.61  This information 
serves as a deterrent against employers by making the costs of violations 
clear, predictable, and real.  If employers fail to follow the new LCL, they 
will be subject to administrative fines, awards of double wages, and liability 
                                           
55
  See Labor Contract Law. 
56
  Labor Contract Law art. 19; Labor Law 1994 art. 21. 
57
  Labor Contract Law art. 19. 
58
  Labor Contract Law arts. 23-24. 
59
  Labor Contract Law art. 4.  “Where an employer formulates, amends or decides rules or important 
events concerning the remuneration, working time, break, vacation, work safety and sanitation, insurance 
and welfare, training of employees, labor discipline, or management of production quota, which are directly 
related to the interests of the employees, such rules or important events shall be discussed at the meeting of 
employees’ representatives or the general meeting of all employees, and the employer shall also put 
forward proposals and opinions to the employees and negotiate with the labor union or the employees’ 
representatives on a equal basis to reach agreements on these rules or events.”  Id. 
60
  Labor Contract Law art. 39.  “Where an employee is under any of the following circumstances, his 
employer may dissolve the labor contract:  1. It is proved that the employee does not meet the recruitment 
conditions during the probation period; 2. The employee seriously violates the rules and procedures set up 
by the employer; 3. The employee causes any severe damage to the employer because he seriously neglects 
his duties or seeks private benefits; 4. The employee simultaneously enters an employment relationship 
with other employers and thus seriously affects his completion of the tasks of the employer, or the 
employee refuses to make the ratification after his employer points out the problem; 5. The labor contract is 
invalidated due to the circumstance as mentioned in Item (1), paragraph 1, Article 26 of this Law; or 6. The 
employee is under investigation for criminal liabilities according to law.”  Id. 
61
  Labor Contract Law ch. VII.  “If the rules and procedure of an employer directly related to the 
employees’ interests is contrary to any laws or regulations, the labor administration department shall order 
the employer to make ratification and give it a warning.  If the rules and procedures cause any damage to 
the employees, the employer shall bear the liability for compensation.”  Id. 
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for actual damages.62  The law allows workers to sue their employers by 
giving workers a private right of action, which can be brought in the local 
employment arbitration bureau or local courts.63  The LCL therefore expands 
both employers’ obligations and workers’ rights in comparison to the 1994 
Labor Law. 
B. The LCL Protects Workers Through Encouragement of Open-Term 
Contracts, but also Gives Employers Flexibility 
Article 14 of LCL protects workers by encouraging, and sometimes 
even requiring, the increased use of open-term contracts.  Open-term 
contracts continue for an indefinite term until the employer or worker 
terminates it.  Termination of open-term contracts, however, is statutorily 
governed.64  As a result, Article 14 is one of the most hotly contested 
provisions in LCL because it decreases the ability of employers to terminate 
at will.65 
1. The LCL’s Article 14 Encourages and Expands Open-Term Contracts 
Article 14 of LCL limits the ability of employers to use fixed-term 
employment contracts, generally requiring that contracts be open-term 
whenever an employee remains with the same employer for an extended 
period.  Under the 1994 Labor Law, employers could discharge workers 
either at the expiration of a term contract or for cause.66  In the past, 
employers used short-term contracts to avoid terminating for cause, because 
an employer could terminate the worker after the stated contractual period 
without needing to pay severance or provide a reason.67  The new LCL limits 
this practice.68  In response, employers are concerned about business 
flexibility, adaptability, and responsiveness.69  Under Article 14, an employer 
                                           
62
  Labor Contract Law ch. VII.  “If an employer violates this Law by dissolving or terminating the 
labor contract, it shall pay compensation to the employee at the rate of twice the economic compensations 
as prescribed in Article 47 of this Law.”  Labor Contract Law art. 87.   
63
  Labor Contract Law art. 77.  “For any employer whose lawful rights and interests are impaired, he 
may require the relevant department to deal with the case, apply for an arbitration, or lodge a lawsuit.”  Id. 
64
  Labor Contract Law.  See also Jian Hang, Doing Business in China: Understanding China’s 
Newly Adopted Labor Contract Law, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 107, 109 (Practising Law Institute eds., 
2008) (mentioning how there is no employment at-will common law counterpart in China). 
65
  See Morris, supra note 11. 
66
  Jian Hang, Doing Business in China: Understanding China’s Newly Adopted Labor Contract Law, 
in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 110 (Practising Law Institute ed., 2008). 
67
 Id. 
68
  Id. 
69
  Putting China’s Labour Contract Law into Practice, supra note 49.  
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is permitted to enter, at most, only two fixed-term contracts with a worker.70  
Severance pay is required for terminating fixed-term contracts, thus adding 
costs to fixed-term contracts.71  The restrictions on fixed-term contracts 
encourage more employers to use open-term contracts with workers, which 
provide more protections.72 
In comparison to the Labor Law, LCL’s Article 14 defines more 
clearly those situations when open-term contracts are created.  The Labor 
Law mentioned open-term contract requirements only in passing, under 
Article 20.  Article 20 of the Labor Law required mandatory open-term 
contracts when a worker had worked for the same employer for ten or more 
years and that worker formally requested an open-term contract from the 
employer.73  Now, LCL provides detailed information to help employers 
navigate open-term contracts.  The relevant provision of LCL’s Article 14 
states:  “The labor contract with unfixed terms shall be concluded unless 
laborers request the conclusion of a labor contract with fixed 
terms . . . [w]here a labor contract with fixed terms has been concluded for 
two consecutive times.”74  After the expiration of a second-term contract, the 
subsequent employment contract is considered an “open-term contract,” 
under which the worker will be employed until he or she decides to 
terminate the contract, reaches retirement age, or until certain circumstances 
occur that give rise to termination.75  Under Article 14, an open-term 
contract also results when the worker has been working for the employing 
unit for ten consecutive years, and in circumstances when contracts have 
been re-concluded due to a restructuring but the worker has been working 
for the employing unit ten consecutive years and is less than ten years from 
the statutory retirement age.76  These examples illustrate LCL’s expanded 
use of open-term contracts. 
2. The LCL Considers Employers’ Interests by Providing Safeguards to 
Prevent “Employment for Life” 
Aware that mandating open-term contracts could harm business, the 
National People’s Congress, the country’s legislative body, attempted to 
balance both the goals of employers and workers in the drafting of LCL.  
                                           
70
  Labor Contract Law art. 14. 
71
  Labor Contract Law art. 46. 
72
  Jian Hang, supra note 66, at 110. 
73
  Labor Law 1994 art. 20. 
74
  Labor Contract Law art. 14. 
75
  See generally Labor Contract Law art. 14. 
76
  Labor Contract Law art. 14. 
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The first draft of LCL stated that a labor relationship without a written 
contract would be “regarded as a long term labor relationship unless the 
worker expresses otherwise.”77  Article 14 seems to enact a compromise 
between the two parties, by providing that, after one year, a labor 
relationship without a written contract would be considered an employment 
contract of indefinite term.78  Hence, an employer does have some flexibility 
in creating employment contracts and not all default contracts will be open-
term. 
In response to business concerns that Article 14 reverts back to the 
“iron rice bowl system” of imposing lifelong employment, China’s State 
Council, the country’s Cabinet equivalent, issued an implementing 
regulation for LCL.79  The Implementing Regulation of LCL provides more 
guidance in interpreting LCL, including Article 14.80  The Council’s goal in 
drafting the regulations was to assure employers that an open-term 
employment contract would not be an “iron rice bowl”, and that employers 
could still dismiss workers if they had proper grounds.81 
The Council’s regulations for LCL provide flexible circumstances for 
worker termination.82  The regulations took immediate effect on September 
18, 2008.83  With respect to Article 14 of LCL, the regulations explicitly 
provide the exceptions under which an employer can terminate a worker 
with an open-term contract.84  The regulations clarify the applicability of 
fourteen circumstances listed in Article 19 of the regulations, stating that an 
employer may terminate an open-ended contract under any of the listed 
circumstances.85  Thus, the regulations make clear that LCL’s list of fourteen 
permitted termination circumstances applies to open-term contracts.86 
Most importantly, the regulations provide employers and workers the 
ability to negotiate termination of an open-term contract.  The first allowed 
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circumstance for termination is based on a negotiated consensus between the 
employer and the worker.87  It allows for termination if both parties agree to 
termination.  It is possible that under this exception, employers might force 
workers to agree to terminate the open-term contract.  At the very least, 
however, the regulations here give employers and workers the ability to 
bargain about the termination of an open-term contract.  Unlike the “iron 
rice bowl” system, both parties are not required to stay together if they wish 
otherwise. 
The regulations also empower employers to terminate open-term 
contracts due to worker actions during the employment period.  The second 
enumerated circumstance allows termination when “the employee is proved 
to have failed to meet the employment conditions during the probation.”88  
The third and fourth circumstances allow for termination when the 
“employee seriously violates the rules and procedures set up by the 
employer” or “the employee seriously neglects his duties or engages in 
malpractice for personal gains and has caused severe damages to the 
employer.”89  The fifth listed circumstance permits termination when “the 
employee simultaneously enters an employment relationship with any other 
employer and thus seriously affects his completion of the tasks assigned by 
the employer, or the employee refuses to correct after the employer has 
pointed out the problem.”90  Pursuant to the above circumstances, employers 
can terminate unsatisfactory workers. 
Circumstances six and seven permit termination based on criminal or 
otherwise illegal actions of the worker—even when the actions in question 
did not occur during work.  The sixth circumstance allows termination if the 
employment contract was procured illegally.91  Integrating item one in LCL’s 
Article 26, the regulation states that an employment contract is invalid if 
“the employee, by means of deception or coercion or by taking advantage of 
the employer’s difficulties, forces the employer to conclude or change the 
employment contract against the employer’s true will.”92  Under LCL, if a 
dispute over the validity of a contract arises, either the labor dispute 
arbitration authority or the people’s court makes the determination.93  The 
seventh circumstance allows for termination when “the employee is under 
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investigation for criminal liabilities.”94  Employers are not required to retain 
a worker when the worker’s actions have shown a potential harm to the 
business. 
The Council regulations also empower employers to terminate 
employees based on circumstances that may be beyond the worker’s control.  
Circumstances eight and nine consider situations when it is no longer 
feasible for the worker to continue the employment relationship.95  For 
instance, the relationship can be terminated when “the employee is sick or is 
injured for a non-work related reason and cannot resume his original 
position after the expiration of the prescribed time period for medical 
treatment, nor can he assume any other position arranged by the 
employer.”96  A worker can also be terminated when he or she “is 
incompetent for his position and is still so after training or being assigned to 
another position.”97  These circumstances provide that while an employer is 
initially required to accommodate the worker, if such accommodations do 
not work, the employer may have grounds for termination.  Although 
employers would need to provide some severance payment, they are not 
obligated to retain incapable workers.98 
External changed circumstances can also provide the basis for 
termination.  Circumstance ten states that if there is a major change in the 
objective circumstances relied upon at the time the employment contract was 
executed, the contract might be voidable.99  Circumstance ten only applies if 
the contract terms cannot be performed and both the worker and employer 
are unable to reach an agreement on amending the existing employment 
contract.100  An employer can also terminate the contract if it experiences 
“serious difficulties in production and business operations.”101  If the 
employer changes its production activity in an enterprise—e.g. introducing a 
material technology innovation or adjusting its operation—it may be allowed 
to fire workers.102  Such termination, however, depends on whether the 
employer has amended employment contracts and, nevertheless, finds 
reduction in its workforce necessary.103  Additionally, the regulation includes 
a catchall, stating that termination may be granted when there are “other 
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objective economic situations in which the employment contract is based 
change substantially, which makes it impossible to perform the employment 
contract.”104  The regulation also allows termination when the “employer is 
being restructured according to the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law.”105 
The regulations implementing LCL address multiple situations in 
which an employer can terminate a worker with an open-term contract.  The 
regulations enumerate possible economic situations where an employment 
relationship may be terminated because it no longer benefits the business.  
The regulations do not force employers to retain workers should the business 
change its employment needs, nor do they require employers to retain 
workers who commit crimes or who become unable to perform required job 
duties. 
3. The LCL Regulations Guide the Implementation Timeline for Open-
Term Contracts, Protecting Workers and Providing Notice to 
Employers 
In an effort to clarify potential misunderstandings between employers 
and workers, the regulations provide additional guidance as to when a 
contract becomes open-ended.  As noted above, Article 14 of LCL provides 
that an open-term contract is created once a worker remains with an 
employing unit for ten consecutive years.  The regulations spell out how this 
ten-year requirement is calculated.  The Labor Law had no such guidance.  
Article 9 of LCL regulations stipulates that the time period begins on the 
date the employer started using the worker, even if that date occurred prior 
to the new LCL.106  As mentioned earlier, the conditions requiring open-term 
contracts under Article 14 exist when a second fixed-term contract expires, 
or when the worker has been working for the same employer for ten 
consecutive years.107  While LCL’s Article 14 strongly supports open-term 
contracts, a fixed-term contract seems to be the default rule for renewals 
unless the stipulations under Article 14 apply.  Hence, employers are not 
stuck with open-term contracts when they first hire a worker so long as they 
create a contract within a year.108 
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The LCL regulations further state that while an open-term 
employment contract has no definite ending date, the contract is not 
preserved if valid reasons exist for its termination.109  In practice, then, open-
term contracts have significant similarities to regular contracts.  Open-term 
contracts provide sufficient flexibility for employers to adjust their 
workforce.  Additionally, the regulations provide a framework for local and 
provincial tribunals to implement their own regulations consistent with LCL.  
They do not amount to a reversion to China’s “iron rice bowl” system.   
However, despite these efforts to clarify Article 14, some foreign 
companies are wary of the law’s implications. 
IV. FOREIGN CORPORATIONS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT INCREASED COSTS 
THAT MAY RESULT FROM OPEN-TERM CONTRACTS, INCLUDING 
DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT OF LCL 
Foreign corporations in China have expressed concern that LCL will 
be enforced disproportionately against them, increasing business costs and 
making investment in China less desirable.110  They are particularly 
concerned about Article 14’s imposition of open-term contracts.111  While it 
is true that most of these concerns arose before passage of LCL’s 
regulations, some of these concerns remain valid—especially in light of 
experiences in Korea, which has labor laws similar to China’s. 
A. Foreign Employers Are Concerned that LCL Unfairly Targets Them 
Based on past experience, foreign employers fear that enforcement 
actions will disproportionately target them.  Reports indicate that foreign 
companies generally comply with Chinese laws and that most worker abuse 
occurs at Chinese-owned firms.112  In fact, one of the critiques of the Labor 
Law of 1994 was that its lax and unfair enforcement put complying 
companies at a competitive disadvantage.113  Foreign companies newly 
operating in China cite unclear regulations as one of the biggest challenges 
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to conducting business.114  Some critics believe that the main issue is not that 
Chinese laws lack worker protection but, rather, that enforcement of such 
laws is poor.115  Such inconsistency in enforcement and implementation 
generally discourages businesses from investing and expanding 
operations.116 
B. Foreign Employers Are Concerned that LCL Will Make it More 
Difficult to Terminate Workers, Resulting in Additional Costs 
Foreign employers are also concerned that LCL’s new requirements, 
especially those governing termination, will significantly increase costs and 
decrease China’s competitive value.  The law does make termination more 
difficult, potentially raising costs.  Some companies, seeking less regulation, 
have moved operations from China to other countries.117 
1. As a Result of the LCL, Some Foreign Employers Have Either Left or 
Have Contemplated Leaving China 
The LCL has adversely affected small and medium size companies, 
especially in labor-intensive industries that adapt to change slowly.118  Since 
the law’s enactment, some companies have left the country or found new 
places to outsource their operations.  For instance, some foreign companies 
have left China to set up operations in countries with fewer worker 
protections—such as Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Cambodia—to cut costs; 
this trend is found most in those businesses with many labor-intensive 
tasks.119  The LCL especially impacts smaller, labor-intensive Taiwanese and 
Hong-Kong owned manufacturers because they have relied on China’s cheap 
labor supply.120  Surveys from the American Chamber of Commerce and the 
consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton indicate that foreign investors plan to 
move some of their operations out of China as a result of the law’s 
passage.121 
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Open-term contracts stand as a major reason for corporate flight, as 
evidenced by the fact that foreign companies both took steps to avoid open-
term contracts before LCL’s passage and opposed the open-term provisions 
of LCL.  Foreign companies took special umbrage at LCL’s required 
severance payments in certain worker terminations.122  For instance, prior to 
the enactment, a few companies asked their workers to resign and then sign 
a new two-year contract to avoid Article’s 14 impositions of indefinite 
contracts, for example the French company, Carrefour.123  Even a domestic 
corporation, Huawei Technologies Co., attempted to terminate employment 
contracts with more than 7,000 workers before the law’s effective date in an 
effort to dodge signing open-ended employment contracts.124  After talks 
with the All China Federation of Trade Unions, Huawei later suspended its 
plan.125  These examples demonstrate that at least some employers are 
hesitant about the impact of open-term contracts.  Employers detest paying 
severance packages and fear costly litigation over whether a worker was 
rightfully terminated.126 
Yet, other variables besides the implementation of LCL explain the 
hardships facing labor-intensive businesses.  The rising value of the Yuan, an 
increase in Chinese business taxes, and more protective environmental 
regulations have also encouraged companies to locate operations 
elsewhere.127  In addition, prior to the global economic downturn of 2008, 
higher material costs were exerting pressure on the profits of many 
industries.128  Because of these confounding factors, the impact of LCL’s 
passage is hard to isolate.  Even so, it seems likely that LCL explains some 
corporate flight from China. 
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C. Employers Are Concerned About Similarities Between South Korea’s 
Strict Labor Laws and China’s LCL 
China’s LCL has similarities to South Korea’s main governing 
employment law, the Labor Standards Act (“LSA”).129  For instance, the 
LSA limits term contracts and requires a difficult standard of “just cause” for 
termination of open-term employment contracts.130  The LSA has been 
unequally enforced against foreigners and has proven inflexible for foreign 
employers.131  South Korea has a reputation of having stringent and 
inflexible employment laws.132  It even has higher employment protection 
compared with other countries under the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development.133  Similarities between LSA and LCL seem to 
validate concerns that LCL will result in problems like those faced in South 
Korea—especially given the similar history of labor relations in the two 
countries.134 
1. South Korea’s Employment Law Limits Employers’ Ability to 
Terminate Workers 
In South Korea, employers do not have much flexibility to terminate 
workers with open-term contracts and need “just cause.”135  South Korea’s 
LSA sets a high standard for grounds of a termination to qualify as “just 
cause.”136  Due to this high standard of protection, employers generally use 
temporary and fixed-term contract workers.  This leads to increased inequity, 
as more temporary and fixed-term workers are employed without the same 
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benefits and job security as employees with open-term contracts.137  
Similarly, China’s LCL provides strong protections for workers with open-
term contracts, which could result in Chinese employers opting to hire 
workers for the short-term rather than for the long-term. 
The use of fixed-term contracts in South Korea has created inequitable 
results, which has led to disruptive protests, demonstrations, and strikes by 
workers.138  These events have also reduced business profitability.139  
Employers have justified hiring temporary and fixed-term contract workers 
with the lower cost of such workers, which is estimated to be forty-four 
percent lower than regular workers.140  However, the productivity of 
temporary and fixed-term contract workers is estimated to be twenty-two 
percent below regular workers with indefinite contracts.141  These hiring 
practices have contributed to worker disgruntlement.  A 2005 government 
survey showed that while eighty percent of regular workers were satisfied, 
only twenty-nine percent of non-regular workers were satisfied.142  Surveys 
also showed limited mobility between regular and non-regular employment.  
In 2003, only fifteen percent of non-regular workers transitioned to regular 
employment.143  High turnover rates result, with sixty-two percent of non-
regular workers having less than one year of tenure; in comparison, only 
thirty percent of regular workers last less than one year.144  Employers also 
provided less training to non-regular workers, probably because employers 
are not required to provide such services to non-regular workers.145  Non-
regular workers also lack protection from unions.146 
All of these factors contributed to a volatile South Korean workforce 
dissatisfied with LSA’s effects.  The stringent regulations ultimately harmed 
both employees and employers.147  Big corporations like Hyundai lost a few 
days of productivity from worker strikes.148  In response, South Korea 
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passed the Act on Protection of Temporary and Part-time Workers in July 
2007.149  Under that act, a temporary worker with a limited-term contract, 
who works for more than two years, is automatically regarded as having an 
open-term contract after the term contract ends.150  The experience of South 
Korea fuels concerns that employers in China will also try to bypass the 
increased protections of LCL—a condition that would only exacerbate 
China’s worker inequality problem. 
2. Critics Contend that South Korea’s Employment Laws Are Unfairly 
Enforced Against Foreign Corporations Due to Inadequate 
Implementation Guidelines—A Concern also Raised by China’s LCL  
Legal analysts have criticized South Korea’s employment laws for not 
providing clear guidelines.  Often, this ambiguity has caused employers to 
hesitate in termination decisions for fear of litigation.151  For instance, the 
LSA does not explicitly define “just cause” for the termination of open-term 
contracts.  Some possible examples from case law include “lack of aptitude, 
continuing defective work, debilitating disease, breach of employment 
contract, egregiously unacceptable behavior on the job, misrepresentation of 
previous school or work experience, or an improper relationship with 
another worker,” but the law itself does not provide any specifics.152  In 
1997, at the request of the International Monetary Fund, a managerial 
urgency requirement was inserted into LSA, allowing termination of a 
worker for administrative reasons.153  Yet the managerial urgency 
requirement clause remains ambiguous.  It states that the requirement is 
permitted when there is an “urgent administrative necessity for the transfer, 
merger, or acquisition of the business in order to prevent administrative 
deterioration.”154  The clause fails to clarify whether transfers, acquisitions, 
and mergers are illustrative or exhaustive of the types of business conditions 
that permit dismissal.155 
Because of its unclear guidelines and lack of flexibility, critics claim 
that LSA unfairly impacts foreign corporations doing business in South 
Korea.  Foreign investors have cited South Korea’s “inflexible labor laws” 
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and “volatile labor-management relations” as significant impediments to 
investment.156  South Korea’s reputation for having a “violence-prone labor 
force” is another major reason why foreigners are discouraged to directly 
invest.157  Additionally, the Korean labor market is generally the most 
consistent worry for foreign multinational corporations, because they believe 
it disadvantages management.158  The situation in South Korea might 
therefore fuel concerns that open-term contracts and strict termination 
guidelines will also prove harmful to foreign business in China. 
For instance, in certain areas China’s LCL regulations are vague and 
could be abused.  The LCL regulations require that in open-term 
employment contracts both laborer and employer shall observe the principle 
of equality and reasonability to decide the content of the labor contract other 
than the term.159  Like the Korean law, the regulations do not provide a 
definition or guide to determine what qualifies as a principle of “equality 
and reasonability.”  In addition, it is unclear what exactly counts as “serious” 
or “material” under the fourteen permitted circumstances listed under LCL’s 
implementating regulations.160  The regulations do provide some examples 
of what types of conduct is “serious” and “material” sufficient to justify 
dismissal of open-term employees (such as providing information to an 
employer’s competitor), based on Article 19 of LCL’s implementing 
regulations but fail to give guidance to courts as to how they should reach a 
determination in a particular instance.  In some ways, the regulations merely 
repeat provisions already stated in LCL without more elaboration.  Hence, 
labor tribunals may have to issue their own regulations of interpretation, 
which could make implementation of LCL less uniform.161 
Additionally, while the regulations allow termination based on 
objective, changed circumstances, the regulations do not explicitly refer to 
Article 41 of LCL, which describes some such circumstances.  This failure 
to refer creates significant disonants.  Article 41 of LCL requires that when 
an employer terminates workers based on a restructuring (in accordance with 
the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law), a serious difficulty in production and 
operation, or a change that causes the nonperformance of an employment 
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contract, the employer must terminate workers on a priority basis.162  The 
last workers to be terminated would be those who have executed an 
employment contract with a relatively long fixed-term or an open-term 
employment contract, or those who are the sole breadwinner of their family 
and must support elders or minors.  Moreover, if the employer must 
terminate twenty or more workers, or more than ten percent of the total 
workers, the employer is required to report to the labor union or all workers 
thirty days in advance.163  Because the regulations, when listing the 
circumstances related to objective, changed circumstances, fail to refer to the 
remaining requirements of Article 41 of LCL, it is unclear whether these 
requirements apply.164 
The regulations are also unclear on whether an employer has the right 
not to renew a second fixed-term contract.165  If employers do not have the 
right to refuse renewing a second fixed-term contract, then employers will 
likely be more reluctant to offer a second fixed-term contract, because to do 
so would essentially create an open-term contract for the worker.  If such is 
the case, employers are only provided one fixed-term contract where they 
are not obligated to give out an open-term contract.  In addition, while the 
regulations provide guidance on how to calculate time for the ten-year 
period, they do not address nuances such as when a company merges with 
another.166 
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priority to the employees cut down.”  Id. 
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  Labor Contract Law art. 41. 
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  Regulations art. 119.  While these additional requirements may seem burdensome, it should be 
noted that they are actually in line with the International Labor Organization’s Termination of Employment 
Recommendation.   
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  Law, supra note 18. 
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  Id.  But see Labor Contract Law art. 10.  Article 10 of the regulation, however, may provide some 
guidance because it states that “if a worker is sent from his/her original Employer to work for a new 
Employer for a reason other than one attributable to himself/herself, his/her years of service with the 
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V. AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S LCL SHOULD ALLEVIATE FOREIGN 
CORPORATIONS’ CONCERNS ABOUT ENFORCEMENT AND COSTS 
China’s LCL provides more guidance than does South Korea’s LSA, 
which should be sufficient to prevent abuse.  It is unclear whether, in the 
future, LCL will be enforced discriminatorily against foreign corporations, 
raising the costs of doing business for these firms; however, as written the 
LCL does not unfairly target foreign employers.  And, thus far, the law has 
not been wrongfully used against foreign employers. 
A. China Provides Flexibility and Clear Standards for Employers, 
Particularly When Compared to South Korea’s Labor Standards Act 
Although China’s LCL shows similarities to South Korea’s 
employment laws, LCL provides standards that are more flexible and clear.  
This increased flexibility and clarity should make enforcement less 
burdensome, uncertain, and unfair.  For instance, China’s law addresses the 
problem of unlimited fixed-term contracts by limiting employers to two 
renewals.167  At the same time, China provides more flexibility by not 
limiting the term of the fixed-term contracts; in contrast, South Korean law 
limits fixed-term contracts to two years.168 
China also specifically defines part-time or temporary workers in 
LCL.169  Part-time workers are paid on an hourly basis, cannot work more 
than four hours daily, and cannot work more than twenty-four hours per 
week.170  Their hourly pay must not be lower than the minimum wage 
prescribed by the local government where the employer’s company is 
located.171  In exchange for these restrictions, employers need not establish 
written employment contracts or severance pay after termination for part-
time employees.172  The LCL gives employers the opportunity to make use 
                                                                                                                              
original employer shall be counted as part of his/her years of service with the new Employer.”  Using 
Article 10, a merger could possibly mean that the new employer must still consider a worker’s years of 
service with the prior employer in the determination of having open term contracts.  This could potentially 
have an impact on a company’s determination on whether to merge.  Article 10, however, does provide that 
if the previous employer has already made severance payments to the worker, the new employer does not 
count the worker’s years of service with the prior employer when calculating severance pay after lawfully 
terminating or ending an employment contract.  Workers therefore do not get to benefit twice from two 
employers unless their working period qualifies for each employer.   
167
  Labor Contract Law art. 14. 
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  Id.  See also Act on the Protection of Fixed-term and Part-time Employees, No. 8074 (2006) (S. 
KOR.). 
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  Labor Contract Law art. 68. 
170
  Id. art. 68. 
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  Id. art. 72. 
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  Id. arts. 69 and 71. 
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of part-time workers; but, given the limited hours, it does not deter 
employers from using them in place of regular workers. 
The implementing regulations of LCL also address protections for 
temporary workers.  Although the law itself does not mention temporary 
workers, Articles 27 through 32 of the regulations provide protections for 
such workers.  The law requires employers to inform temporary workers of 
the job requirements for their position, provide them with the necessary 
training, pay them the same amount as other workers doing the same job, 
and most importantly, abide by state labor standards relevant to their 
positions.173  Temporary workers are also subject to severance pay.174  
Hence, while employers may hire workers on a temporary basis, LCL 
contains fewer loopholes, and better protects such workers, than does South 
Korea’s LSA. 
In contrast to South Korea’s LSA, China’s LCL provides clearer 
guidance and examples for its equivalent managerial urgency requirement.  
As discussed above,175 the managerial urgency provision of LSA permits 
employers to dismiss open-term employees under certain exigent 
administrative circumstances, but supplies only broad categories to indicate 
what circumstances qualify.176  By contrast, LCL supplies fourteen 
circumstances under which an employer may terminate a contract.177  While 
there may be nuances to the interpretation of the fourteen circumstances, the 
examples limit the adjudicating tribunal’s discretion and give employers a 
better sense of what events qualify for termination.  While LCL and its 
regulations do limit the reasons for termination, such limits are reasonable in 
that they balance the competing interests of employers and their workers. 
The initial reactions to LCL’s impacts and enforcement have been 
positive.  Based on statistics from twenty-six provinces, municipalities, and 
autonomous regions, Minister of Human Resources and Social Security Yin 
Weimin stated that, as of June 2008, the percentage of workers by region 
that had signed employment contracts is now between ninety to ninety-six 
percent.178  While there is not yet much data on issues dealing with 
termination, a few months after the law’s passage, a Hitachi worker was 
                                           
173
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Id. 
174
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properly fired even though she had signed an open-term contract.179  She 
was fired for disobeying orders and continually making errors in her work.180  
Although this is just one case, it supports the contention that Article 14 and 
its implementing regulations have enabled termination when justified.  To 
further ensure consistent enforcement across jurisdictions, China could 
invest in training programs to better educate and equip local officials and 
their related institutions.181 
While LCL regulates fixed-term contracts, it also provides clear 
guidelines for indefinite-term contracts so that employers have a solid 
understanding of termination circumstances.  The guidelines will help make 
termination justifications uniform on a national level, reducing unequal 
enforcement of LCL.  Additionally, by putting limits on fixed-term contracts, 
workers are better protected; employers can no longer use fixed-term 
contracts to avoid the obligations that accompany full employment.  
Standards for protecting temporary and part-time workers should also deter 
employers from substituting part-time workers for regular workers, reducing 
concerns of an unstable workforce like South Korea’s. 
B. The LCL Has Not Been Used to Unfairly Target Foreign Employers 
The LCL has been enforced primarily against domestic, rather than 
foreign, employers.  Most multinational corporations already comply with 
local labor laws and regulations in their Chinese facilities.182  Generally, the 
companies that complied with the Labor Law have not been as affected by 
enforcement of LCL.183  It is even likely that, over the long term, LCL will 
actually help big, foreign corporations due to the law’s impact on smaller, 
local competitors who did not comply with the Labor Law, and who will 
now be forced to adapt.184  Big corporations might therefore have an 
advantage.  In fact, foreign investment in China has continued to grow since 
LCL’s enactment.185  Some European governments also find laws like LCL 
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helpful in conducting business in China and view them in a positive light.186  
Generally, profitable Western companies are not leaving China as a result of 
the law, despite prior threats.187 
Consequently, it appears that LCL has not been unequally or unfairly 
enforced against foreign companies and employers.  Enforcement actions 
brought against domestic companies, like the case of Huawei Technologies 
discussed above,188 indicate that LCL will be applied equally to both 
domestic and foreign employers.  When Huawai, one of China’s largest 
producers of telecommunications equipment, tried to influence workers to 
quit and sign new employment contracts with the intention of avoiding open-
term contracts, authorities in Guangdong province’s court and arbitration 
committee designed a new set of regulations that would have made such a 
maneuver illegal.189 
VI. CHINA’S LCL WILL HELP ACCOMMODATE CHINA’S GROWING 
ECONOMY  
In addition to improving the general workers’ condition, LCL and its 
regulations will help pave the way to an increasing focus on value-added 
industries, such as technology and services to better improve the economic 
progress of China.190  Having a stable, dependable, and cooperative 
workforce is crucial to develop these industries.  Open-term contracts can 
help China achieve that goal.191  Additionally, studies from other countries 
show that open-term contracts do not generally create widespread 
unemployment and may actually prove beneficial to the economy.192 
A. China Is Shifting Its Economy to Value-Added Industries That Will 
Require Better Employment Relations 
In response to some negative effects from manufacturing industries, 
cities in China have been shifting their focus to value-added industries.193  
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  European Companies Expect More Business in China, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Sept. 10, 2008, 
available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6497168.html.  
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Manufacturing provides the least amount of profits globally.194  It has 
resulted in serious social and environmental problems in some of China’s 
biggest cities.195  For instance, Beijing encourages foreign investment in 
industries that bring China more expertise, technology, and better jobs 
instead of industries in the low-end sector.196  Other cities want to make 
similar changes.  For instance, Guangdong is moving away from its 
emphasis on the export-processing industry.197  While the industry made 
Guangdong one of China’s wealthiest cities, workers’ rights were constantly 
violated while local officials turned a blind eye.198  Turnover was extremely 
high, and corporations violated environmental and labor laws.199  Value-
added industries, on the other hand, not only make greater profits, but also 
tend to require a better-trained workforce, which requires more investment 
to retain and train workers.200  In this light, China’s focus on changing its 
dominant industries can lead to better social relations, in addition to better 
profits.  However, if China is to move towards having a high-value market, it 
will need a stable, dependable and cooperative workforce.201  Not ensuring 
stability may result in a long-term lag in productivity, causing the country’s 
industries to be less competitive globally.202 
B. Open-Term Contracts Can Aid China’s Industrial Shift While 
Protecting Workers 
The LCL will create better worker protections, which, in turn, should 
facilitate China’s move towards value-added industries and increased 
economic growth. 
1. The LCL Restricts Fixed-Term Contracts and Encourages Open-Term 
Contracts, Which Will Improve Workers’ Conditions and Create a 
Workforce Suitable for Value-Added Industries 
The LCL’s limits on fixed-term contracts in favor of open-term 
contracts will help China in its goal of improving employment relations.  
This improvement could, in turn, increase harmony and profits at the same 
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time.  Other countries’ experiences have shown that open-term contracts 
may provide more benefits than fixed-term contracts.203  Open-term 
contracts can help foster China’s goals of social consensus and equality.204  
Regulations expanding the use of open-term contracts can help offset the 
inequalities of income created by the market and increase competitive 
advantages.205  On the other hand, emphasis on fixed-term contracts can 
increase the poverty risk for workers, which may result in social 
dissension.206 
Open-term contracts often reduce turnover while encouraging worker 
loyalty, which helps employer profits and long-term growth.207  Open-term 
contracts not only improve employee welfare but also efficiency, especially 
in industries choosing to compete on quality rather than on mere price.208  
Open-term contracts stimulate commitment and cooperation in the 
employment relationship.  Studies show that, as a result, both parties invest 
more in training, which increases productivity.209 
Along similar lines, LCL’s encouragement of open-term contracts 
requires interaction among employers and workers, which can prove 
beneficial for the employer’s business.  Although Article 14 will increase 
transaction costs for employers by requiring them to ensure that their 
manuals and contracts are in compliance, it will also generate clearer 
expectations for both parties by forcing employers to articulate the details of 
the work relationship.210  According to one firm’s study conducted before the 
enactment of LCL, Chinese workers cited dissatisfaction with their 
compensation and benefits and noted that they did not know how their 
performance was being measured.211  However, open-term contracts may 
affect certain groups negatively.212  Better protection of workers and fixed 
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labor costs from open-term contracts has been shown to increase 
unemployment, particularly among the low-skilled work force.213  This could 
be problematic in China, given that there is a huge population of low-skill 
workers.  One should keep in mind that fixed-term contracts are still 
permitted under LCL and that options still exist to blunt potential negative 
effects of open-term contracts.  Fixed-term contracts will continue to be used 
by employers where their use gives workers better incentive to be 
productive.214 
The limitations LCL places on the use of fixed-term contracts are 
appropriate given the negative impacts that pervasive use of short fixed-term 
contracts have on the workforce.  There is no evidence that providing fixed-
term contracts boosts long-term economic growth or creates higher levels of 
employment.215  Studies show that low employment security results in 
workers’ lack of identification with and loyalty to the corporation.  That lack 
of worker investment leads to under-investment in human resource 
development, with workers not being encouraged to pursue further 
training.216  For example, studies show that fixed-term contracts, as 
compared to open-term contracts, in the United States and Spain have led to 
decreased job stability, lower pay, worse working conditions, frequent 
periods of unemployment, and higher poverty risk.217  In Spain, fixed-term 
contracts have not created incentives for employers to rehire workers.218  
South Korea, as mentioned earlier, is a prime example of some negative 
effects of short fixed-term contracts.219  Hence, having only fixed-term 
contracts can hinder national competitiveness and may actually exacerbate 
unemployment in certain circumstances.220 
China’s LCL balances the interests of employers and workers by 
making open-term contracts the default mode for long-term employment, but 
also allowing limited use of fixed-term contracts.  While LCL clearly affords 
some preference to open-term contracts, permitting fixed-term contracts will 
help preserve employment opportunities for the low-skill workforce.  
Additionally, LCL’s preference for open-term contracts will help transition 
China’s economy to more value-added industries. 
                                           
213
  Id. 
214
  See Theodore Groves et al., Autonomy and Incentives in Chinese State Enterprises, THE Q. J. OF 
ECON. 183, 208 (Feb. 1994). 
215
  See Esping-Anderson, supra note 209, at 72. 
216
  See Kitt, supra note 134, at 561; JONES, supra note 137, at 43. 
217
  See Amuedo-Dorantes & Serrano-Padial, supra note 206, at 42. 
218
  See Esping-Anderson & Regini, supra note 212, at 340. 
219
 See supra Part IV.C. 
220
  See Regini, supra note 205, at 26. 
462 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 18 NO. 2 
 
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
China’s transition from a planned economy to a market economy has 
resulted in growing inequality and worker exploitation.  China enacted the 
Labor Law in 1994, but its requirement that employers use employment 
contracts was weakly enforced, due in part to unclear expectations among 
both employers and workers.  The deficiencies of the Labor Law left many 
workers unprotected and insecure, which began to threaten the stability of 
China’s workforce. 
The enactment of LCL in 2008 came at a crucial time.  It addressed 
many of the gaps left by the Labor Law.  With LCL’s expanded and explicit 
support of open-term contracts, both workers and employers better 
understand the law governing employment relationships.  The LCL prompts 
employers to be more explicit in their requirements, creating clearer 
expectations for both employers and workers, which should in turn lead to 
better relations.  The LCL also increases protection for workers without 
preventing employers from terminating employees for just cause.  While 
Article 14 does not completely resolve the issue of whether an employer is 
obligated to renew a second fixed-term contract,221 foreign companies 
should not feel threatened by the possibilities of having open-term contracts.  
Open-term contracts will not constitute employment for life, nor will their 
protections under LCL prove as inflexible as similar provisions in South 
Korean labor law. 
Open-term contracts may also aid China in its transition into a more 
high-value, industrialized economy.  While LCL does not target foreign 
companies, it remains unclear whether the law will be enforced 
appropriately—particularly because the regulations were passed very 
recently.  Foreign corporations will likely need more time to evaluate the 
law’s impact on their daily business.  Yet, they can be assured that LCL does 
not amount to a reversion to the “iron rice bowl” system.  It is now up to the 
Chinese government and local tribunals to realize LCL’s promise. 
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